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Over the past several decades, accounting standard setters have been gradually 
shifting financial reporting toward an asset/liability view, by rewriting the underlying 
conceptual framework and issuing accounting standards that reflect this view.  The 
asset/liability view enhances comparability of a firm‟s investment base to that of its peers, 
and thus enhances the comparability of a firm‟s return of equity (ROE).  This, in turn, 
increases the transparency with which firm-specific performance differs from its peers.  
Greater transparency would be expected to improve predictive usefulness, but would also 
place greater pressure on a firm to meet the performance of its peers.  In the US, I find that 
predictive usefulness has generally increased with the shift, indicating that rather than 
resulting in greater earnings management designed to mask firm-specific differences, the 
shift resulted in greater transparency of firm-specific accounting information.  I also find 
predictive usefulness has increased in countries that have adopted IFRS, indicating that a 
further shift toward an asset/liability view to include the greater use of fair values common in 
IFRS further increased transparency of firm-specific accounting information in adopting 
countries.  This suggests that expanding the use of fair values and/or adopting IFRS in the 
US may also result in greater reporting transparency.  But as the predictive usefulness 
increases, I find that analysts in the US are not increasing their reliance on firm-specific 
accounting information, suggesting analysts remain skeptical, even though analysts would 






1.  INTRODUCTION 
The Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) has been gradually shifting away 
from a revenue/expense point of view and toward an asset/liability view since it issued Statement 
of Financial Accounting Concepts No. 6 (SFAC 6) in 1985, and later in 2010 with the issuance 
of SFAC 8.
1
  Over this time period, however, little accounting research has been aimed at testing 
the implications of this shift in viewpoint over time.  The asset/liability view aims to prescribe 
the measurement of assets and liabilities such that income determination would be based on 
changes in those assets and liabilities, according to the Securities and Exchange Commission 
(SEC) in a report to Congress in 2003, pursuant to Section 108(d) of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act.  
Alternatively, the SEC report describes the revenue/expense view as giving primacy to the direct 
measurement and recognition of revenues and expenses, rendering the balance sheet residual to 
the income statement. 
While financial statements have multiple purposes, SFAC 8 reinforces that the purpose of 
financial reporting is to provide information to decision makers for resource allocation decisions 
(SFAC 8 par. OB2).  At the most basic level, this would be information that is helpful in 
assessing the prospects for future cash flows (SFAC 8 par. OB3; Barth 2006).  Interest in future 
cash flows, however, leads primarily to an interest in information about earnings rather than 
information directly about cash flows (SFAC 1, par. 43). Therefore, future prospects of the firm 
would be better reflected by accrual accounting than cash flows (SFAC 8 par. OB17; Dechow 
1994; Healy and Wahlen 1999; Dichev and Tang 2009).   My evidence suggests that the 
predictive usefulness of accounting information has improved over the time period in which 
                                                          
1




standards have been shifting toward the asset/liability view, both in the US and internationally, 
but analyst forecasts do not seem to be benefiting from this shift. 
The accounting literature has long expressed concerns regarding the revenue/expense 
point of view.  For instance, Chambers (1956) claimed that the fault with the focus on earnings is 
that earnings is a meaningless number unless considered in conjunction with the investment upon 
which it was generated.  Edwards and Bell (1961) echoed Chambers‟ concerns by claiming that a 
focus on earnings would actually detract from earnings quality if accounting book value does not 
accurately reflect the investment base.  According to the SEC (2003) report, the shift toward the 
asset/liability view should enhance the ability to accurately measure the investment base.  One 
expected outcome is that the improved measurement of the investment base would also enhance 
the comparability of a firm with like-kind organizations (peers, within its industry or country).   
To test whether the shift toward an asset/liability view impacted predictive usefulness, 
my first step is to determine how to best identify the effects of such a shift.  The extant literature 
has examined how the usefulness of accounting information has evolved as standards have 
shifted over time indirectly, by testing changes in value relevance (Collins et al. 1997; Brown et 
al. 1999); and directly, by testing the predictability of revenues and expense components (Dichev 
and Tang 2008) or individual income statement line items (Donelson et al. 2011).  I focus on the 
Ohlson (1995) disaggregation of earnings into „normal‟ and „abnormal‟ earnings, where normal 
earnings is based on a firm‟s net book value multiplied by a „normal‟ rate of return (which 
empirically is proxied as the rate of return of a firm‟s peers); and, abnormal earnings is the 
residual or difference between aggregate earnings and normal earnings.  In light of Chambers 
(1956) concerns, among others, I scale aggregate earnings and its components (normal and 
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abnormal) by a firm‟s weighted average book value, thus expressing my test variables in terms of 
return on equity (ROE, NormROE, or AbROE).
2
 
Within the Ohlson (1995) framework, the more accurate the measurement of a firm‟s 
investment base, the more accurate would be the measurement of normal earnings, and thus, the 
more the firm would be expected to be comparable to its peers.  To the extent that the shift in the 
asset/liability view enhanced the comparability of a firm to its peers, abnormal earnings would 
more accurately reflect the extent that a firm differed from its peers.  The net effect on predictive 
usefulness from increasing comparability of a firm to its peers, therefore, would be to increase 
the transparency of firm-specific performance, and reduce the extent that a firm could mask their 
performance as being the „norm‟ for its peers. While greater transparency would be expected to 
improve predictive usefulness, a firm would also face greater pressure to meet the performance 
of its peers and thus provide incentives for a firm to engage in earnings management, which 
would likely weaken predictive usefulness.    
In the US, I test whether the shift over time toward an asset/liability view improved or 
weakened predictive usefulness relative to a firm‟s industry peers.
3
  The shift in the underlying 
viewpoint in the US can be marked with the passage of SFAC 6 in 1985, but this shift would 
trickle down gradually through the adoption of subsequent accounting standards that reflected 
this shift.  The first major US accounting standard subsequent to SFAC 6 to reflect the shift 
toward the asset/liability view was in 1987 with the adoption of Statement of Financial 
                                                          
2
  A firm‟s weighted average book value is calculated as the beginning net book value adjusted for weighted 
average capital contributions during the period.  Dichev and Tang (2008), among others, scale by total assets 
rather than net book value.  I scale by net book value, however, since scaling by total assets alone captures the 
effects of only the asset part of the shift toward the asset/liability view.  The choice of deflator does not 
materially alter my conclusions. 
3
  I use the Fama-French 30 industry classifications as my industry base, and use the industry rates of returns 




Accounting Standards (FAS) No. 87 on pensions.  FAS 87 deviated from prior practice by 
recording changes in value of the pension assets and liabilities on the balance sheet, while 
deferring certain gains and losses to future periods (i.e., allowing non-articulation between the 
balance sheet and income statement).  In 1994, FAS 115 on marketable securities further 
deviated from prior practice by departing from the historical cost principle and requiring fair 
values of marketable securities to be recorded on the balance sheet without requiring most gains 
and losses to be recorded in earnings.  In 2001, FAS 133 on derivatives became effective with 
the passage of FAS 137.  FAS 133/7 continued this shift to an asset/liability view by recognizing 
the effects of certain hedges on the balance sheet, again without recognizing the gains or losses 
through earnings.  Finally in 2007, FAS 157, 158, and 159 expanded the use of fair value 
accounting to financial assets and liabilities, and modified the accounting treatment of pensions 
and marketable securities.   
The shift toward an asset/liability view in the US thus far has stopped short of 
incorporating many of the fair value provisions found in International Financial Reporting 
Standards (IFRS).  IFRS represent the next step in the asset/liability continuum, and an important 
extension of my analysis as the US continues to contemplate its adoption.  While it is 
indeterminable whether a further shift in the asset/liability view in the US through the adoption 
of IFRS would improve or weaken predictive usefulness, examining the impact of adoption of 
IFRS in other countries would provide evidence of how IFRS impacted predictive usefulness in 
these countries.  Many countries that have adopted IFRS had as part of their local generally 
accepted accounting principles (GAAP) elements of fair values that predated the adoption of 
IFRS (Barth et al. 2008), beyond the level currently found with US GAAP.  Thus it is likely that 
if the US were to adopt IFRS, the resulting effects of the shift further toward an asset/liability 
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view would be even greater than what I may document by examining the adoption of IFRS in 
other countries.  
Initially, the international accounting literature expected to find greater comparability 
across countries with the adoption of IFRS.  But even with adoption of uniform reporting 
standards across countries, Hail et al. (2010) and Liao et al. (2012), among others, find that 
consistency or comparability in financial reporting may not be achieved due to deep rooted 
country differences.  But with the greater emphasis of the asset/liability view found with IFRS, 
the comparability would be expected to be higher to a firm‟s peers within country (similar to my 
domestic analysis within industry), and not necessarily to a firm‟s industry peers in other 
countries, even if cross-country peers are within a similar industry.
4
 
I extend my tests of predictive usefulness to 24 countries that required IFRS adoption in 
2005.  To disaggregate earnings into its normal and abnormal components, I base the „normal‟ 
rate of return on a county‟s rate of return.
5
  Since many countries allowed early adoption of IFRS 
as early as 2002, I evaluate how predictive usefulness changed with the beginning of the 
transition period, and the beginning of the mandatory adoption period in 2005.   
If I find that the shift toward the asset/liability view improved the predictive usefulness of 
accounting information, I would also expect that analysts, specifically in the US where markets 
are consistently more efficient, would rely more on firm-specific information in forming their 
forecasts of future performance.  I would otherwise expect them to rely less on firm-specific 
information if I find predictive usefulness decreases with the shift.  In facing the uncertainty of 
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  Data limitations restricted my analysis to a country level, where industry level within each country would likely 
provide a stronger peer group.  The within-country level analysis, however, provides insights into how an 
economy wide shift toward an asset/liability view affects predictive usefulness, similarly to how the economy as 
a whole could be impacted upon the US adopting IFRS. 
5





how firms might respond to the increase in comparability, analysts may instead rely more on 
other information outside of the financial statements as new standards are adopted that shifted 
the viewpoint.  This, of course, is an empirical question whether analysts would adjust their 
reliance on firm-specific information as standards shift toward an asset/liability view.     
I find that predictive usefulness has generally increased as standards have shifted in the 
US, with significant increases with the adoption of FAS 87 and FAS 157-9, indicating that rather 
than resulting in greater earnings management designed to mask firm-specific differences, the 
shift toward the asset/liability view resulted in greater transparency of firm-specific accounting 
information over time.  I also find predictive usefulness has increased as standards have shifted 
over time in my sample of countries that have adopted IFRS, indicating that a further shift 
toward the asset/liability view to include the greater use of fair values common in IFRS further 
increased transparency of firm-specific accounting information in adopting countries.  This 
suggests that expanding the use of fair values and/or adopting IFRS in the US would likely also 
result in greater reporting transparency.  But as the predictive usefulness increases, I find that 
analysts in the US are not increasing their reliance on firm-specific accounting information, 
suggesting analysts remain skeptical, even though the analysts would likely increase the 
efficiency in which they form their forecasts by relying more on accounting information. 
My study should be of particular interest to accounting standard setters as they continue 
to debate the merits of further shifting US reporting toward an asset/liability view – namely the 
potential convergence to, or adoption of IFRS.  My study also highlights for financial statement 
users that the predictive usefulness of accounting information has been increasing as the 
standards shift over time, thus providing better guidance on a firm‟s future prospects upon which 
resource allocation decisions are based.    
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The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows.  Section 2 discusses the background and 
related literature.  Section 3 presents my model and hypothesis development.  Section 4 reviews 
my sample selection procedures and presents descriptive statistics of my variables.  Section 5 




2.  BACKGROUND AND RELATED LITERATURE 
Prior to the shift toward an asset/liability view in 1985 with SFAC 6, authoritative 
pronouncements were written from a revenue/expense viewpoint.  Early standard setting bodies, 
such as the American Institute of Accountants (AIA), regarded the balance sheet as simply the 
connecting link between successive income statements (Accounting Research Bulletin 43).
6
  
Subsequent to the AIA, the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants (AICPA) charged 
the Accounting Principles Board (APB) with forming principles upon which to develop 
accounting standards.  These principles of the APB, maintained the revenue/expense view.  With 
the formation of the FASB, US accounting standards were based on underlying concept 
statements, which have been considered an improvement over the piecemeal approach of 
previous standard setting bodies.  The FASB‟s first concept statement, SFAC 1 issued in 1978, 
inherited the myopic focus on reported earnings that was characteristic of the pre-FASB regime. 
  The FASB shifted its thinking towards a more balanced view of financial reporting, one 
that recognized the complementary roles of the income statement and the balance sheet, as 
initially expressed through SFAC 6, issued in 1985.  SFAC 6 defines all elements of financial 
reporting in terms of assets and liabilities, thus giving primacy to the balance sheet.  The most 
recent revisions to the conceptual framework contained in SFAC 8, issued in 2010, formally 
incorporate into the concept statement those ideas put forth by Chambers (1956).  That is, it 
replaced the myopic focus on the reporting of earnings found in SFAC 1 with the notion that the 
income statement and balance sheet are equally important for users to gauge performance based 
on the investment base.     
I document the evolution in financial accounting standards by identifying five distinct 
time periods that are marked by major shifts toward an asset/liability view of accounting.  Within 
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 The AIA (1917 – 1957) is a predecessor to the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants (AICPA). 
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each time period, I highlight, below, those standards that bolstered the shift toward the 
asset/liability view, starting with the issuance of the first concept statement. 
2.1 Pre-FAS 87 (1978 – 1986) 
I use the issuance of the SFAC 1, in 1978, as the beginning of my analysis.  In the years 
following, earnings takes center stage in financial reporting as that first guidance emphasized 
“The primary focus of financial reporting is information about an enterprise‟s performance 
provided by measures of earnings and its components” (SFAC 1).  Although concept statements 
do not have the authority of standards, they do guide future financial accounting practice and 
serve as the basis for evaluating existing guidance.  As such, this first concept statement was 
effectively a mold from which future standards would also be cast with an income statement 
focus.  One such example is FAS 81 Disclosure of Postetirement Health Care and Life Insurance 
Benefits (effective 1985) mandating the disclosure of annual cash payments to retirees for such 
benefits. Clearly this „pay-as-you-go‟ approach was issued with the income statement in mind.   
 2.2 Post-FAS 87 (1987 – 1993) 
FASB made substantial progress toward the asset/liability view with the issuance of FAS 
87 Employers’ Accounting for Pensions, effective in 1987.  This standard is unique in that it 
affected the reporting of the balance sheet separately from the income statement.  It improved the 
reporting of the balance sheet by requiring a minimum pension liability to be recognized in an 
effort to reflect assets and liabilities more accurately.  Adjustments due to changes in value of 
plan assets and liabilities were then allowed to bypass current earnings and be reported directly 




2.3 Post-FAS 115 (1994 – 2000) 
The FASB broke from the long-standing historical cost concept with the adoption of FAS 
115 Accounting for Certain Investments in Debt and Equity Securities, in 1994, marking another 
major turning point towards the asset/liability view of accounting.  This standard was issued to 
address the accounting and reporting for certain investments in debt and equity securities on the 
balance sheet and established categories for debt and equity securities that require unrealized 
gains and losses on available-for-sale securities to be excluded from the current period‟s earnings 
and be reported in a separate component of shareholders‟ equity.  Gains and losses are recycled 
upon disposal of the underlying securities.   
This time period is also marked with the adoption of a cluster of accounting standards 
that became effective in the early to mid-1990s that bolstered the shift toward the asset/liability 
view.  By the end of 1992, FAS 106 Employers’ Accounting for Postretirement Benefits other 
than Pensions became effective to replace the „pay as you go‟ method of accounting for these 
liabilities.  The inclusion of an estimate of the present value of liabilities of this type has been 
shown to be value relevant to investors (Amir 1993).  Effective in 1993, FAS 109 Accounting for 
Income Taxes was issued to ensure an „asset and liability‟ approach to reporting income taxes. 
The various components of the deferred tax item on the balance sheet provides additional 
information beyond the sum of this item, hence enhancing the predictive usefulness of 
accounting information (Amir et al. 1997).  Further, FAS 121 Accounting for the Impairment of 
Long-Lived Assets and for Long-Lived Assets to Be Disposed Of was issued in 1995 (effective 
1996) in response to firms inconsistently recognizing asset impairment (Barth et al. 1998; Barth 




2.4 Post-FAS 133/7 (2001 – 2006) 
The next major shift towards the asset/liability view was evidenced by FAS 133 
Accounting for Derivative Instruments and Hedging Activities with an effective date delayed 
until 2001 by FAS 137 Accounting for Derivative Instruments and Hedging Activities—Deferral 
of the Effective Date of FASB Statement No. 133.  This standard improved the accounting for 
derivatives by requiring that financial statements reflect the off-balance sheet positions that firms 
had assumed.    
Also during this period, the FASB began issuing standards that allow more fair value 
estimates to be included in financial reporting.  FAS 142 Goodwill and Other Intangible Assets 
was issued in response to the increasing importance of intangible assets on a firm‟s balance 
sheet.  The desired result of this standard was that “financial statement users will be better able to 
understand the investments made in those assets and the subsequent performance of those 
investments (FAS 142 page 7)”.   Lee (2011) finds evidence that goodwill is more predictive of 
future cash flows post SFAS 142 than prior to this standard.     
2.5 Post-FAS 157-9 (2007 – 2012) 
As of 2007, firms began changing the way they reported pensions and marketable 
securities on the balance sheet and increased the level of fair value disclosure with the FASB‟s 
issuance of a cluster of standards focusing on fair value.  FAS 157 Fair Value Measurements 
provided clarification to the fair value measurement in FAS 115 and FAS 133.  FAS 158 
Employer’s accounting for Defined Benefit Pension and Other Post Retirement Plans, an 
amendment of FASB Statements No. 87,88,106, and 132(R) required an employer to recognize 
the overfunded or underfunded status of a defined benefit postretirement plan (other than a 
multiemployer plan) as an asset or liability.  Changes to that funded status are to be recognized 
12 
 
through comprehensive income.  FAS 159 Fair Value Option for Financial Assets and Financial 
Liabilities (Including an Amendment of FASB Statement No. 115 further clarified the fair value 
option for FAS 115 items.  This standard also moved FASB closer to international reporting as it 
is similar to IAS 39 Financial Instruments: Recognition and Measurement.  
2.6 Extending to IFRS 
Currently, US GAAP is limited in the extent that fair values are incorporated into 
accounting information.  Adoption of IFRS would significantly further the shift in the US toward 
an asset/liability view.  The FASB has made strides toward convergence or adoption of IFRS 
through the joint project with IASB in issuing SFAC 8.  The project to revise the standard 
setters‟ conceptual frameworks is no longer joint, but is being advanced individually according 
the respective agendas of the FASB and the IASB.  According to Leslie Seidman, Chairperson of 
the FASB, however, the US remains committed to promoting convergence toward IFRS, with the 
overall goal being to have a single set of high quality standards (Tysiac 2013).  
As an example of how IFRS furthered the shift toward an asset/liability view, consider 
International Accounting Standards (IAS) 16 Property, Plant, and Equipment.  IAS 16 allows the 
application of fair values to a firm‟s operating assets.  Aboody et al. (1999) document a relation 
between asset revaluations and future performance of UK firms, providing evidence of how the 
use of fair values could enhance predictive usefulness.  The extant literature has documented 
some issues that face IFRS implementation, such as a country‟s legal system, securities laws, 
political economy, and tax regime create incentives for manages that influence reporting and 
could impact the comparability expected to be found with the adoption of IFRS (LaPorta et al. 
1998; Bushman and Piotroski 2006; Barth et al. 2012).  By focusing on within-country 
comparability, my study would be less susceptible to some of these issues.   
13 
 
3.  MODEL AND HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT 
As guidance on the relation between future earnings and current accounting information, 
I begin with Ohlson‟s (1995) simple earnings persistence model, in which future earnings is 
modeled as a function of current earnings, as follows:
 7
     
 tjtjtj ErE ,,1,
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 = earnings attributable to common shareholders, for firm j from time t to t-1; 
r  = the „normal‟ rate of return;  
tji ,
~  = error term.  
Equation (1) represents a setting where the expected future earnings is simply a function 
of current earnings adjusted for a firm‟s expected rate of return.  To the extent that the measure 
of earnings is noisy, or the extent that the rate of return varies from expectations, the predictive 
usefulness of equation (1) will be weak.  If a firm is expected to generate future earnings beyond 
the „normal‟ rate of return, however, the earnings expectation can be expressed (following 
Ohlson 1995) in terms of the „normal‟ return on investment (book value) and the extent that 





~~     (2) 
where: 





 = earnings beyond a „normal‟ rate of return, defined as abnormal earnings and 
calculated as 1,,  tjtj rBVE , for firm j from time t to t-1;  
                                                          
7
  Ohlson‟s (1995) simple characterization also includes a term for current dividends, which I exclude for clarity 
and to be comparable with the related earnings predictability literature (see for example, Dichev and Tang 
2008).  Ohlson‟s (1995) framework also includes an „other information‟ term, ν, that I also suppress in my 
analysis for clarity and comparability to the extant literature.  
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  = persistence of earnings beyond a „normal‟ rate of return on net book value. 
Any reduction in measurement error of a firm‟s investment base from the shift toward the 
asset/liability view would not be evident in the expected relation between current and future 
earnings in equation (1).  In equation (2), however, the shift toward the asset/liability view is 
expected to reduce the measurement error in normal earnings ( tjrBV , ), resulting in the observed 
relation between current normal earnings and future reported earnings to be less noisy as 
standards have shifted over time.  Since the measurement error of abnormal earnings (defined as 
1,,  tjtj rBVE ) also would be decreasing as the accuracy of the measurement of book value 
increases, I would expect the relation of abnormal earnings with future reported earnings to also 
be less noisy with the shift over time.   
Empirically, a firm‟s „normal‟ rate of return (r) in the US is based on the industry rate of 
return (Fama-French industry rate of return – see Myers 1999, among others).  Since the shift 
toward an asset/liability view increases the comparability of a firm‟s book value to its industry 
peers, application of the industry r relegates normal earnings to be the average industry rate of 
return (upon deflating by average book value, and expressing earnings in terms of return on 
common equity or ROE).  Further, by normal earnings representing the industry rate of return, 
abnormal earnings would be the extent that a firm‟s specific rate of return deviates from the 
industry averages. One consequence of the shift toward the asset/liability view and greater 
comparability of a firm to its industry peers, however, could be that managers may have 
incentives to inject noise (earnings management) into their reported earnings to obfuscate the 
extent that their firm may differ from their industry peers.   
As a benchmark for whether the shift toward the asset/liability view has improved the 
predictive usefulness of accounting earnings, I express equation (1) empirically in terms of ROE 
15 
 
by deflating the relation by the weighted average net book value to serve as my benchmark, as 
follows:   
 tjtjtj ROEROE ,,101,     (3) 
where: 
tjROE ,  = return on equity, calculated as earnings attributable to common shareholders, for 
firm j from time t to t-1, divided by the weighted average net book value of 
common equity, for firm j at time t; 
i  = regression coefficients. 
As standards shift over time, the relation between current and future ROE, represented by 
1 , would shift with changes in underlying macroeconomic conditions (Donelson et al. 2011).  
To test whether decomposing ROE into its normal and abnormal components improves the 
predictive usefulness of accounting information with the shift toward the asset/liability view, I 
deflate the relation expressed in equation (2) by the weighted average net book value.  Since my 
focus is to test whether the predictive usefulness of firm-specific accounting information 
improved with the shift in view, I express the right-hand-side of equation (2) empirically in terms 
of a firm‟s ROE and abnormal ROE, as follows: 
  tjtjtjtj AbROEROEROE ,,2,101,     (4) 
where: 
tjROEbA ,  = abnormal return on equity, calculated as tjtj ROENormROE ,,  , where 
tjROENorm , is the weighted average net book value of common equity multiplied 
by the „normal‟ rate of return ( tjrBV , ) , for firm j at time t, divided by the 
weighted average net book value of common equity, for firm j at time t; 
i  = regression coefficients. 
16 
 
In equation (4), since tjAbROE , is a component of tjROE , , 1  represents the extent that 
only tjNormROE , is associated with 1, tjROE , and 2  represents the extent that the association of 
tjAbROE , with 1, tjROE differs from that of tjNormROE , .  As is the case with the coefficient, 1 , 
on tjROE ,  in equation (3) above, shifts in industry-wide macroeconomic conditions would be 
reflected in changes to 1 , since tjNormROE ,  represents the returns of a firm‟s industry.
8
  As 
such, tjROE ,  in equation (4) serves as a control for changes in the underlying macroeconomic 
conditions over time.  My tests of whether the shift toward an asset/liability view improved the 
predictive usefulness of accounting information is, therefore, represented by the coefficient, 2 , 
on tjAbROE ,  from equation (4).   
Since the expectation of accounting standard setters and others are that the shifts toward 
an asset/liability view over time will improve comparability, and thus more clearly delineate how 
a firm‟s performance (ROE) differs from its peers through tjAbROE , , I would expect the 
coefficient, 2 , on tjAbROE ,  to be increasing as the standards shift over time.  Such an increase 
in 2  would be indicative of improvements in earnings quality.  But with a more clear 
delineation between firm-specific performance and the performance of the industry as a whole, 
managers would face greater pressures to manage earnings to meet industry norms.  To that 
extent, such pressures would hamper earnings quality and reduce predictive usefulness, as 
reflected in a decrease in 2  with the shift over time.  It is this tension of how predictive 
                                                          
8
  Note that in equation (4), tjNormROE , simplifies to the peer group r. For studies within a single country (as 
with my US tests), the peer groups which tjNormROE ,  represent is industry, as stated.  In applying this 
analysis across multiple countries, I propose the appropriate peer group would be within-country peers.   
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usefulness changes as standards shift over time (T denoting my time periods) that I test in my 
first set of hypotheses, stated (in alternative form) below:   
H1a: In the US, the predictive usefulness of AbROE increased or decreased as standards 
shift over time ( 0)( 122 
TT   or 0)( 122 
TT  ; T [Pre-FAS 87, Post-FAS 87, Post-
FAS 115, Post-FAS 133/7, Post-FAS 157-9] ).   
H1a tests whether the shifts in the asset/liability view improve the predictive usefulness 
of accounting information across my sample time periods in the US.  This hypothesis is 
predicated on the premise that the predictive usefulness of the disaggregated model, represented 
in equation (4), increases as accounting standards shift toward the asset/liability view, due to the 
greater comparability of a firm to its industry peers.  The underlying macroeconomic conditions 
may be such that in any particular time period, however, the comparability of firms within an 
industry may be hampered.  In such a case, disaggregating ROE into NormROE and AbROE 
would not improve the predictive usefulness of accounting information over the aggregate 
model, represented in equation (3), and can even inject noise into the relation between current 
and future ROE.  It is this underlying premise about the predictive usefulness of disaggregating 
ROE that I test.  I formally state this (in alternative form) in my hypothesis below: 
H1b: In the US, the predictive power of the Disaggregated Model (DM) is greater than 





RSqrRSqr ; T [Pre-FAS 87, Post-FAS 87, Post-FAS 115, Post-FAS 133/7, 
Post-FAS 157-9] ).   
My first set of hypotheses test the extent that the shift in standards toward an 
asset/liability view enhances predictive usefulness in the US.  But as discussed above, US 
standards have not yet incorporated IFRS.  Accounting standards in other countries that have 
adopted IFRS have shifted further toward an asset/liability view than standards in the US, since 
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IFRS incorporates more fair values than standards in the US.  By extending my study to test the 
effects of the shift in the asset/liability across multiple countries that have adopted IFRS, I are 
able to test my expectation that IFRS increase predictive usefulness.   
To empirically test across countries the aggregate and disaggregate models presented in 
equations (3) and (4), respectively, a firm‟s peer group would be those like-kind firms within a 
country.  The extant literature has overwhelmingly documented the difficulties in cross-country 
comparisons, in that even with a common reporting system, local practices erode comparability 
(for example, see Liao et al. 2012). Thus the „normal‟ rate of return (r) applied in determining 
NormROE and AbROE would most appropriately be the country-level rate of return.  In an 
international setting, therefore, the shift toward an asset/liability view through the adoption of 
IFRS increases the comparability of a firm‟s book value to its within-country peers, and 
application of the country-level r relegates normal earnings to be the average within-country rate 
of return. 
I restrict my international sample to those firms in countries that adopted IFRS in 2002, 
with a mandatory adoption of IFRS by 2005.  This restriction allows me to draw distinct 
windows in which I can identify a shift in the asset/liability view to test for changes in predictive 
usefulness.  If the adoption of IFRS and its shift toward an asset/liability view improved 
predictive usefulness of accounting information, I would expect predictive usefulness to be 
increasing from the pre-IFRS period prior to 2002, to the transition period of 2002-2004 in which 
many countries allowed firms to early adopt IFRS, to the post-IFRS period beginning in 2005.  
Such an increase would be evidenced by 2  from equation (4) increasing over my time periods.  
But as the case with other shifts toward an asset/liability view that I test in my first hypotheses in 
the US, if IFRS more clearly delineate between firm-specific performance and the performance 
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of the country as a whole, managers would face greater pressures to manage earnings to meet 
country norms.  Such pressures would likely reduce predictive usefulness, and 2  from equation 
(4) would be decreasing over my time periods.  It is this effect from IFRS I test in my next set of 
hypotheses on predictive usefulness, stated (in alternative form) below:   
H2a: Internationally, the predictive usefulness of AbROE increased or decreased as 
standards shift over time ( 0)( 122 
TT   or 0)( 122 
TT  ; T [Pre-IFRS, Trans-IFRS, 
Post-IFRS] ).   
H2a tests whether the shift in the asset/liability view improves the predictive usefulness 
of accounting information with the transition to, and adoption of IFRS.  Unlike the US, however, 
the accuracy of the peer group performance is likely to be very noisy, since the within-country 
peer group is likely to be much less correlated with actual firm performance than would an 
industry peer group.  Disaggregating ROE into NormROE and AbROE would improve the 
predictive usefulness of international accounting information only to the extent that within-
country comparisons reduce, rather than increase the level of noise.  I therefore test whether 
disaggregating ROE in an international setting improves the predictive usefulness of accounting 
information.  I formally state this (in alternative form) in my hypothesis below: 
H2b: Internationally, the predictive power of the Disaggregated Model (DM) is greater 





RSqrRSqr ; T [Pre-IFRS, Trans-IFRS, Post-IFRS] ).   
Finding whether the predictive usefulness increases or decreases over time documents the 
correlation of peer or firm specific rates of return with future realized performance, but does not 
address whether analysts are utilizing this information in developing their forecasts.  If the shift 
toward the asset/liability view increases the comparability of a firm to its peers, and improves the 
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predictive usefulness of firm-specific rates of return (AbROE), I would expect analysts to rely 
more on AbROE in their forecasts as standards shift over time.  If the shift toward the 
asset/liability view creates more noise when comparing a firm‟s rate of return to its peers‟ 
average rate of return, I would expect analysts to rely less on AbROE in their forecasts with the 
shift over time.   
I address my research questions about analyst forecasts by focusing on the US firms and 
recasting equations (3) and (4) using analyst forecasts at time t of a firm‟s future ROE over time t 
to t+1 )( 1,
t
tjFROE  as the dependent variable in tests of these models (henceforth referenced as 
equations (3’) and (4’)).9  As above, I would expect the coefficient, 2 from equation (4’) on 
tjAbROE ,  to be increasing as standards shift over time.  Such an increase in 2  as standards shift 
over time would be indicative that analysts are relying more heavily on firm-specific rates of 
return as accounting standards shift toward an asset/liability view.  Alternatively, a decrease in
2  would indicate that analysts are relying less on accounting information as standards shift over 
time.  I test this in my final set of hypotheses, stated (in alternative form) below:   
H3a: In the US, the association of analyst forecasts with AbROE increased or decreased 
as standards shift over time ( 0)( 122 
TT   or 0)( 122 
TT  ; T [Pre-FAS 87, Post-
FAS 87, Post-FAS 115, Post-FAS 133/7, Post-FAS 157-9] ).  
H3a tests whether analysts rely more on firm-specific rates of return as accounting 
standards in the US shift toward the asset/liability view across my sample time periods.  This 
hypothesis is predicated on the presumption that if the decomposition of ROE into normal and 
                                                          
9
  I restrict my analyst forecast tests to the US sample, thus restricting the question to analysts‟ view of the 
usefulness of the increased comparability in a firm‟s investment base to others within its industry.  Such a test 
internationally would be a joint test of comparability and the usefulness of a country-level return, which is the 
focus of my second hypothesis.  Further, global data on analyst forecasts are less reliable and less available than 
in the US.     
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abnormal components improves the predictability of earnings over time as the standards shift 
toward an asset liability view, analysts would rely more on accounting information and, in effect, 
form their forecasts based on an industry component and a firm-specific component.  But 
analysts may view this disaggregation as noisy, may myopically rely on aggregate ROE, or may 
rely on information not yet reflected in accounting earnings or book values.  It is this underlying 
presumption about analysts‟ willingness to rely more on disaggregated industry and firm-specific 
information as accounting standards shift toward an asset/liability view over time that I test.    I 
formally state this (in alternative form) in my hypothesis below: 
H3b: In the US, the predictive power of the Disaggregated Model (DM) is greater than 





RSqrRSqr ; T [Pre-FAS 87, Post-FAS 87, Post-FAS 115, Post-FAS 133/7, 




4.  SAMPLE SELECTION AND DISCRIPTIVE STATISTICS 
4.1 Sample Selection Procedures   
In Table 1.a, I provide details of my sample selection and screening procedures for my 
US sample.  I collect annual data for my US sample from Compustat for the time period of 1978 
to 2012. This results in a sample of 299,272 firm-year observations.  I exclude observations due 
to missing data required to calculate ROE.  This results in a deletion of 42,752 firm-year 
observations.  I also exclude 37,667 firm-year observations in finance industry (SIC code 6000) 
because special rules that apply to financial institutions are not generalizable to a broader 
sample.  I exclude 26,185 firm-year observations where book value (total common equity) is 
negative, due to the inability to disaggregate ROE within my framework.  Finally, I limit my 
sample to the largest 1,100 firms by total assets which results in the deletion of 154,168 firm 
year observations.
10
  My final sample for testing my hypothesis on ROE (H1) is 38,500 firm-year 
observations, 9,900, 7,700, 7,700, 6,600, and 6,600 for time periods for the Pre-FAS 87 (1978–
1986), Post-FAS 87 (1987–1993), Post-FAS 115 (1994–2000), Post-FAS 133/7 (2001–2006),and 
Post-FAS 157-9 (2007–2012),  respectively.  
I collect the analyst forecasts of one-year-ahead earnings from I/B/E/S detail file for all 
available years and merge this data with the other accounting variables from Compustat.  19,589 
firm-year observations remain to test my hypothesis related to analysts‟ forecasts (H3).  The 
distribution of this data is 2,002, 3,647, 4,475, 4,385, and 5,080 firm-year observations for Pre-
FAS 87 (1978 – 1986), Post-FAS 87 (1987 – 1993), Post-FAS 115 (1994 – 2000), Post-FAS 
133/7 (2001 – 2006), and Post-FAS 157-9 (2007 – 2012), respectively. 
                                                          
10
  I follow Dichev and Tang (2008) and limit my sample to the largest firms by total assets each year in order to 
reduce any bias that might result from uneven coverage of firms in the database over the years.  By keeping 









Initial Sample fromCompustat 64,020 61,550 72,795 52,768 48,139 299,272
Less firm-years:
Missing information (6,046) (10,761) (7,906) (6,838) (11,201) (42,752)
Finance industry (4,769) (6,424) (9,923) (8,887) (7,664) (37,667)
Negative book value (5,366) (5,819) (7,394) (3,977) (3,629) (26,185)
Not in the top 
asset ranking (37,939) (30,846) (39,872) (26,466) (19,045) (154,168)
Sample for H1 Tests on ROE 9,900 7,700 7,700 6,600 6,600 38,500
Less firm-years:
(7,898) (4,053) (3,225) (2,215) (1,520) (18,911)
2,002 3,647 4,475 4,385 5,080 19,589
 
Total














Table 1.a Sample Selection and Screening Procedures
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Table 1.b, presents my sample selection procedures required to test my hypothesis related 
to international firms (H2).  I collect data from OSIRIS (Bureau van Dijk) for a sample of firms 
from 24 countries that adopted IFRS in 2002 with mandatory adoption by 2005.  I partition my 
sample into three periods beginning with the earliest year for which data required to compute ROE 
is available. My first period starts in 1995 (the earliest year in which country level return data was 
available through Trading Economics) and ends in 2001.  I label this period the Pre-IFRS period.  
Since many firms were allowed to adopt IFRS earlier than the 2005 mandatory date, I label 2002 
to 2004 as my Trans-IFRS period.  Finally, I label 2005 to 2012 as the Post-IFRS period.  This 
results in an initial sample over all three periods of 225,542 firm-year observations.  I delete 
131,007 firm-year observations for missing required data and another 15,584 for negative values of 
total common equity.  This results in a sample of 78,951 firm-year observations, 22,202, 13,624, 
and 43,125 for the Pre-, Trans-, and Post-IFRS periods, respectively.   
Initial Sample from Osiris 79,901 38,319 107,322 225,542
Less firm-years:
Missing information (50,084) (21,782) (59,141) (131,007)
Negative book value (7,615) (2,913) (5,056) (15,584)
Sample for H2 Tests on ROE 22,202 13,624 43,125 78,951
Sample Countries
Austria 471 227 588
Belgium 172 158 883
Czech Republic 376 89 88
Germany 3,288 1,891 5,895
Denmark 432 319 1,090
Estonia 10 40 126
Spain 584 365 1,134
Finland 487 374 929
France 3,362 1,874 5,500










In Table 2.a, I present industry rates of return based on the Fama-French 30 industry 
classifications.  My sample is dispersed across available industries and fairly balanced across my 
sample years.   
Table 2.b, presents country rates of returns obtained from Trading Economics website.  I 
present annual returns per country for the Pre-IFRS, Trans-IFRS, and Post-IFRS time periods.   
The annual rates of return are more volatile for some countries (Greece and Finland, for 
example) than others (Estonia in the earlier periods, and Latvia, for example), suggesting the 
importance of within country comparisons, since cross-country comparisons would likely prove 
too volatile. 
Sample Countries
Greece 571 310 1,828
Hungary 81 53 125
Ireland 349 206 574
Iceland 19 25 92
Italy 485 537 1,827
Luxembourg 38 85 351
Latvia 9 56 245
Netherlands 385 298 1,052
Norway 343 201 857
Poland 128 136 967
Portugal 237 162 370
Romania 0 11 71
Sweden 1,447 772 3,059
Slovakia 11 25 72
United Kingdom 8,917 5,410 15,402










Std. Std. Std. Std. Std.
Obs. Mean Dev. Obs. Mean Dev. Obs. Mean Dev. Obs. Mean Dev. Obs. Mean Dev.
1 Food 286 0.234 0.146 237 0.195 0.173 231 0.185 0.149 185 0.104 0.077 199 0.133 0.064
2 Beer 45 0.249 0.167 40 0.249 0.186 41 0.203 0.138 34 0.067 0.065 33 0.130 0.081
3 Tobacco 30 0.224 0.079 32 0.228 0.147 13 0.219 0.136 16 0.193 0.124 18 0.181 0.095
4 Recreation  120 0.226 0.157 140 0.234 0.140 137 0.119 0.080 179 0.180 0.140 161 0.190 0.211
5 Printing 124 0.247 0.110 144 0.149 0.049 148 0.196 0.129 132 0.073 0.067 88 0.141 0.204
6 Consumer 153 0.171 0.139 143 0.144 0.092 136 0.192 0.109 87 0.089 0.064 86 0.087 0.039
7 Apparel  42 0.249 0.178 59 0.206 0.196 63 0.101 0.103 62 0.154 0.139 65 0.197 0.180
8 Health 214 0.197 0.139 247 0.201 0.220 349 0.283 0.178 373 0.066 0.070 389 0.105 0.080
9 Chemicals  290 0.215 0.136 268 0.158 0.092 249 0.152 0.077 241 0.124 0.100 223 0.254 0.215
10 Textiles  56 0.257 0.127 71 0.268 0.209 52 0.081 0.044 17 0.128 0.087 14 0.174 0.165
11 Construction 292 0.219 0.093 254 0.170 0.112 211 0.124 0.118 213 0.187 0.166 210 0.126 0.115
12 Steel 183 0.155 0.112 178 0.150 0.038 154 0.165 0.178 118 0.243 0.224 108 0.138 0.146
13 Fabricated 314 0.177 0.094 237 0.172 0.086 178 0.156 0.116 205 0.159 0.147 210 0.231 0.198
14 Electrical 71 0.197 0.131 70 0.190 0.139 66 0.297 0.165 71 0.151 0.153 82 0.174 0.135
15 Auto 142 0.159 0.142 134 0.200 0.123 149 0.152 0.112 123 0.141 0.210 102 0.227 0.240
16 Aircraft 157 0.230 0.120 130 0.172 0.107 94 0.200 0.180 75 0.178 0.118 88 0.168 0.112
17 Mining  55 0.169 0.147 45 0.136 0.121 48 0.066 0.041 31 0.221 0.230 44 0.239 0.246
18 Coal  24 0.159 0.113 10 0.104 0.133 16 0.235 0.212 28 0.209 0.200 46 0.224 0.237
19 Petro 385 0.219 0.138 298 0.141 0.107 294 0.181 0.094 280 0.196 0.116 429 0.123 0.106
20 Utilities  1,885 0.183 0.078 1,511 0.155 0.091 1,373 0.182 0.140 1,197 0.156 0.098 1,084 0.112 0.074
21 Communication  499 0.179 0.095 538 0.204 0.129 588 0.246 0.189 406 0.098 0.107 264 0.144 0.112
22 Services  162 0.223 0.138 265 0.171 0.194 454 0.335 0.220 516 0.107 0.101 617 0.156 0.170
23 Business Eq. 350 0.190 0.112 380 0.106 0.072 482 0.342 0.213 540 0.147 0.243 561 0.175 0.196
24 Business Supp. 242 0.204 0.109 276 0.133 0.085 225 0.140 0.081 166 0.094 0.105 171 0.152 0.175
25 Transportation  420 0.197 0.112 369 0.220 0.142 278 0.157 0.137 259 0.113 0.079 265 0.117 0.119
26 Wholesale  176 0.257 0.146 196 0.168 0.093 252 0.154 0.122 197 0.114 0.083 230 0.143 0.137
27 Retail  409 0.226 0.149 517 0.223 0.198 474 0.224 0.178 455 0.112 0.088 444 0.139 0.100
28 Restaurants 67 0.200 0.109 65 0.229 0.132 94 0.109 0.101 103 0.166 0.141 95 0.154 0.135
30 Other 2,707 0.268 0.135 846 0.144 0.126 851 0.124 0.087 291 0.106 0.103 274 0.088 0.076
Table 2.a Domestic Distribution of Industry Rates of Return
Post-FAS 157-9        
(2007-2012)
Pre-FAS 87             
(1978-1986)
Post-FAS 87            
(1987-1993)
Post-FAS 115           
(1994-2000)






4.2 Descriptive Statistics 
In Panel A of Table 3, I present descriptive statistics for the key variables.  In Panel A, I 
present descriptive statistics for my US sample.  I find that the mean ROE is highest and with the 
least standard deviation in the 1978-1986 time period, even though this period is depicted as 
double- digit inflation.  The 1987-1993 time period exhibits the lowest mean ROE, with mean 
ROE stabilizing for the remaining sample periods.  The distribution of AbROE is consistent with 
Std. Std. Std.
Obs. Mean Dev. Obs. Mean Dev. Obs. Mean Dev.
Austria 471 0.014 0.079 227 0.266 0.189 588 0.071 0.351
Belgium 172 0.057 0.198 158 0.094 0.230 883 0.024 0.267
Czech Republic 376 -0.018 0.186 89 0.348 0.141 88 0.073 0.299
Germany 3,288 0.120 0.240 1,891 0.000 0.337 5,895 0.098 0.236
Denmark 432 0.112 0.198 319 0.097 0.227 1,090 0.094 0.284
Estonia 10 0.047 0.001 40 0.432 0.066 126 0.120 0.376
Spain 584 0.130 0.235 365 0.056 0.246 1,134 0.022 0.234
Finland 487 0.195 0.455 374 -0.095 0.183 929 0.043 0.278
France 3,362 0.142 0.246 1,874 -0.029 0.215 5,500 0.014 0.218
Greece 571 0.191 0.488 310 0.069 0.278 1,828 -0.038 0.370
Hungary 81 0.158 0.385 53 0.270 0.170 125 0.074 0.302
Ireland 349 0.154 0.154 206 0.058 0.266 574 -0.008 0.295
Iceland 19 0.124 0.270 25 0.431 0.098 92 0.043 0.295
Italy 485 0.051 0.263 537 0.006 0.198 1,827 -0.051 0.228
Luxembourg 38 -0.116 0.095 85 0.111 0.262 351 0.041 0.311
Latvia 9 0.469 0.001 56 0.258 0.279 245 0.023 0.289
Netherlands 385 0.146 0.218 298 -0.066 0.176 1,052 0.032 0.260
Norway 343 0.089 0.261 201 0.155 0.366 857 0.104 0.303
Poland 128 0.037 0.272 136 0.266 0.163 967 0.095 0.291
Portugal 237 0.102 0.297 162 0.010 0.189 370 0.009 0.274
Romania n/a n/a n/a 11 0.407 0.093 71 0.080 0.303
Sweden 1,447 0.200 0.307 772 0.015 0.306 3,059 0.075 0.256
Slovakia 11 0.077 0.241 25 0.339 0.141 72 -0.030 0.165
United Kingdom 8,917 0.068 0.153 5,410 -0.009 0.166 15,402 0.037 0.158
Pre-IFRS                    
(1995-2001)
Tran-IFRS               
(2002-2004)
Post-IFRS               
(2005-2012)
Contry
Table 2.b International Distribution of Industry Rates of Return
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prior literature (Meyers 1999).  I find that the mean AbROE is consistently negative, peaking 
during the 1987-1993 time period, and leveling off over the remaining periods.  Analyst forecasts 
represented by FROE increases monotonically across sample periods.  Consistently, I find 
between 14- and 19-percent of firms reporting losses over the time periods, and firm size 
continued to grow throughout my sample period.  I find that INTANG is generally increasing 
over the sample periods suggesting the intangible intensity of firms.  I find that the percentage of 
firms categorized as being highly influenced by the shift toward principles-based standards, high 
P-score firms (retail, construction, and restaurant) ranges from 8-percent to nearly 12-percent in 
later periods. The percentage of low P-score firms (tobacco, coal, and utilities) is greater.  In 
Panel B of Table 3, I report descriptive statistics for my international sample.  I find that across 
my 24 countries, the mean ROE is negative during the transition period in which firms were 
allowed to early adopt IFRS and continued to be negative during the post-adoption period.  
Within Table 3, ROE is earnings before extraordinary items minus dividends paid to 
preferred shareholders, for firm j in year t, divided by a weighted average of common equity 
from time t-1 to t; AbROE is earnings, minus dividends paid to preferred shareholders, minus normal 
earnings, for firm j in year t, divided by a weighted average of common equity from time t-1 to t.  Normal 
earnings is the r (industry rate of return) multiplied by the weighted average of common equity from time 
t-1 to t; FROE is the average of the one-year-ahead earnings forecasts for firm j in year t, calculated from 
the first forecast per analyst made after the announcement of prior period's earnings; LOSS is a dummy 
(0,1) indicator variable set to one if earnings before extraordinary items is negative and zero otherwise; 
SIZE is the natural log of total assets for firm j in year t; INTANG is a dummy (0,1) indicator variable set 
to one if the firm is in an industry categorized by Collins et al. (1997) as being intangible intensive, and 
equal to zero otherwise; P-SCORE(H) is a dummy (0,1) indicator variable set to one if the firm is in an 








Std. Std. Std. Std. Std.
Variable Obs. Mean Dev. Obs. Mean Dev. Obs. Mean Dev. Obs. Mean Dev. Obs. Mean Dev.
9,900 0.131 0.102 7,700 0.049 0.350 7,700 0.108 0.264 6,600 0.095 0.328 6,600 0.105 0.350
9,900 -0.087 0.161 7,690 -0.144 0.444 7,665 -0.101 0.420 6,541 -0.076 0.469 6,561 -0.084 0.476
2,002 0.079 0.085 3,647 0.096 0.111 4,475 0.139 0.197 4,385 0.161 0.237 5,080 0.187 0.230
LOSS 9,900 0.078 0.268 7,700 0.177 0.381 7,700 0.143 0.350 6,600 0.183 0.387 6,600 0.184 0.387
SIZE 9,900 7.349 1.000 7,700 7.742 1.041 7,700 8.079 0.995 6,600 8.360 1.055 6,600 8.598 1.073
INTANG 9,900 0.095 0.293 7,700 0.133 0.339 7,700 0.168 0.373 6,600 0.189 0.392 6,600 0.185 0.388
P-SCORE (H) 9,900 0.078 0.268 7,700 0.109 0.311 7,700 0.101 0.302 6,600 0.117 0.321 6,600 0.113 0.317




Variable Obs. Mean Dev. Obs. Mean Dev. Obs. Mean Dev.
22,202 0.044 0.406 13,624 -0.066 0.590 43,125 -0.037 0.561
22,202 -1.078 93.295 13,624 -0.222 12.780 43,125 -0.174 7.534
LOSS 22,202 0.243 0.429 13,624 0.374 0.484 43,125 0.356 0.479
SIZE 22,202 11.972 2.163 13,620 11.678 2.396 43,117 11.756 2.529
INTANG 22,202 0.184 0.388 13,624 0.229 0.420 43,125 0.219 0.414
P-SCORE (H) 22,202 0.148 0.356 13,624 0.122 0.328 43,125 0.106 0.308
P-SCORE (L) 22,202 0.029 0.168 13,624 0.026 0.160 43,125 0.025 0.157







Pre-IFRS                   
(1995-2001)
Tran-IFRS                
(2002-2004)
Post-IFRS                  
(2005-2012)
Pre-FAS 87                
(1978-1986)
Post-FAS 87            
(1987-1993)
Post-FAS 115           
(1994-2000)
Post-FAS 133/7        
(2001-2006)
Table 3 Descriptive Statistics
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based on Folsom et al.‟s (2011) industry level P-score ranking, and equal to zero otherwise; and P-
SCORE(L) is a dummy (0,1) indicator variable set to one if the firm is in an industry ranked in the bottom 
decile based on the level of influence from the change in accounting principles based on Folsom et al.‟s 
(2011) industry level P-score ranking, and equal to zero otherwise. 
As with my US sample, I consistently find that the mean AbROE is negative, but with 
more extreme levels of standard deviations.  I also find a between 24- and 38-percent of my 
sample firms report losses across the time periods, a level slightly higher than in the US.  
Further, as opposed to my findings in the US where the mean of firm size was increasing through 
the time, average firm size is fairly stable across the entire 18 year period.   Consistent with my 
US sample, I find INTANG to be generally increasing over time.  Unlike my US sample, the 
percentage of firms categorized as high P-score is greater than that of firms categorized as low P-
score firms.   
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5. EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
5.1 Results from Regressing Future ROE (Tests of H1)   
 Table 4 presents my results from testing 1, tjROE  with the aggregate and disaggregate 
models.  I find that in general, the coefficient on tjROE , , decreases over time, in the aggregate 
model, consistent with the prior literature‟s findings that earnings persistence has been dropping 
over time (Dichev and Tang 2008; Donelson et al. 2011).  This drop is also evidenced in my 
disaggregated model with the coefficient on tjROE , , generally dropping over time.  Within 
Table 4, *, **, *** indicate two-way significance at the ten-, five-, and one-percent levels, 
respectively; #, ##, ### indicate one-way significance at the ten-, five-, and one-percent levels, 
respectively.  The number of observations are: 9,900; 7,700; 7,700; 6,600; and, 6,600 for sample 
periods Pre-FAS 87 (1978–1986), Post-FAS 87 (1987–1993), Post-FAS 115 (1994–2000), Post-
FAS 133/7 (2001–2006), and Post-FAS 157-9 (2007–2012), respectively. ROE is earnings before 
extraordinary items minus dividends paid to preferred shareholders, for firm j in year t, divided 
by a weighted average of common equity from time t-1 to t.  AbROE is earnings, minus 
dividends paid to preferred shareholders, minus normal earnings, for firm j in year t, divided by a 
weighted average of common equity from time t-1 to t.  Normal earnings is the r (industry rate of 
return) multiplied by the weighted average of common equity from time t-1 to t.  The drop in 
persistence is attributable to the economy and the ability of accounting information to reflect the 
underlying performance of a business (Donelson et al. 2011).  To test whether the shift towards 
asset/liability view improves the predictive usefulness of accounting information across my 
sample time periods (H1a), I focus on the coefficient on tjAbROE ,  in the disaggregate model.  I 
find the coefficient on tjAbROE ,  
increases by 0.211 (significant at the one-percent level) with the 
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0.026 0.747 0.427 0.027 0.741 0.006 0.427 0.000
10.50 *** 46.29 *** 10.88 *** 45.70 *** 1.03
0.014 0.677 0.523 0.045 0.520 0.217 0.538 0.016 ###
3.77 *** 31.08 *** 8.66 *** 17.87 *** 7.71 ***
[Diff ('87-'93  '78-'86)] -0.071 *** -0.221 *** 0.211 ***
0.065 0.421 0.310 0.103 0.276 0.252 0.358 0.049 ###
16.43 *** 20.00 *** 22.69 *** 12.53 *** 13.35 ***
[Diff ('94-'00  '87-'93)] -0.256 *** -0.244 *** 0.035
0.060 0.457 0.321 0.081 0.305 0.290 0.358 0.037 ###
13.91 *** 18.94 *** 17.00 *** 11.20 *** 9.72 ***
[Diff ('01-'06  '94-'00)] 0.036 0.028 0.038
0.074 0.358 0.190 0.102 0.169 0.407 0.273 0.083 ###
14.55 *** 13.75 *** 17.37 *** 5.15 *** 10.30 ***
[Diff ('07-'12  '94-'00)] -0.099 *** -0.136 *** 0.116 ***
Table 4
Tests of H1: Results from Estimating the Aggregate and Disaggregate Models - Future ROE








Intercept ROE Intercept ROE AbROE






tjtjtj ROEROE ,,101,   tjtjtjtj AbROEROEROE ,,2,101,  
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adoption of FAS 87, and increases again by 0.116 (significant at the one-percent level) with the 
adoption of FAS 157-9.  These increases in the coefficient on tjAbROE ,  suggest that as 
standards shift toward the asset liability view, deviations in a firm‟s performance from the 
industry norm become more transparent.  Thus, my results indicate that managers are not using 
their reporting discretion to artificially meet the performance of the industry.  Instead, financial 
reporting is improving the predictive usefulness of firm-specific information over time.     
Table 4 also reports the results from testing H1b, that is, whether disaggregating ROE in 
to NormROE and AbROE improves the predictive power of accounting information relative to 
the aggregate model.  The disaggregation would improve predictive power only if the shift to the 
asset/liability view did indeed increase comparability and hence improve predictability and thus 
transparency.  When comparing the predictive power of the models, using the Vuong (1989) test, 
I find the Adj. R
2
 of the disaggregate model to be larger by 0.016, 0.049, 0.037, and 0.083 in the 
Post-FAS 87, Post-FAS 115, Post-FAS 133/7, and Post-FAS 157-9 periods, respectively 
(significant at the one-percent level).   This lends support to the underlying premise that the shift 
towards an asset/liability view would increase the comparability of a firm to its industry peers 
and thus making firms-specific information incrementally meaningful.  
5.2 Results from Regressing Future ROE for IFRS (Tests of H2)   
Table 5 presents my results from expanding my tests to consider the effects of IFRS.  
Unlike my US sample, I do not observe any significant changes in the coefficient on tjROE , , in 
the aggregate model, over time, nor with tjROE ,  in the disaggregate model.  This suggests that 
as financial reporting shifts toward an asset/liability view, accounting maintains its ability to 
reflect firms‟ underlying economic reality.  When testing H2a, I find an overall increase of 0.102 
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0.059 0.293 0.087 0.073 0.194 0.187 0.122 0.035 ###
23.39 *** 15.40 *** 28.23 *** 9.17 *** 11.53 ***
-0.022 0.295 0.079 -0.038 0.193 0.298 0.151 0.071 ###
-4.76 *** 14.33 *** -7.80 *** 8.83 *** 13.39 ***
   [Diff (Trans - Pre)] 0.002 -0.001 0.110 ***
-0.009 0.291 0.104 -0.002 0.169 0.289 0.181 0.077 ###
-3.65 *** 30.87 *** -0.90 16.91 *** 26.20 ***
***
   [Diff (Post - Trans)] -0.005 -0.024 -0.009
   [Diff (Post - Pre)] -0.003 -0.025 0.102 ***
Table 5
Tests of H2: Results from Estimating the Aggregate and Disaggregate Models - International








Intercept ROE Intercept ROE AbROE
Pre-IFRS 
Adoption 
tjtjtj ROEROE ,,101,   tjtjtjtj AbROEROEROE ,,2,101,  
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(significant at the one-percent level) on the coefficient on tjAbROE , , from the Pre-IFRS period 
to the Post-IFRS period.  This result is driven by the increase of 0.110 (significant at the one-
percent level) with the initial transition to IFRS.  My findings suggest that, internationally, where 
the shift toward the asset/liability has evolved to a greater extent under IFRS, the predictive 
usefulness of firm-specific information has improved over time.   
Within Table 5, *, **, *** indicate two-way significance at the ten-, five-, and one-
percent levels, respectively; #, ##, ### indicate one-way significance at the ten-, five-, and one-
percent levels, respectively.  The number of observations are: 9,900; 7,700; 7,700; 6,600; and, 
6,600 for sample periods Pre-FAS 87 (1978–1986), Post-FAS 87 (1987–1993), Post-FAS 115 
(1994–2000), Post-FAS 133/7 (2001–2006), and Post-FAS 157-9 (2007–2012), respectively. 
ROE is earnings before extraordinary items minus dividends paid to preferred shareholders, for 
firm j in year t, divided by a weighted average of common equity from time t-1 to t.  AbROE is 
earnings, minus dividends paid to preferred shareholders, minus normal earnings, for firm j in 
year t, divided by a weighted average of common equity from time t-1 to t.  Normal earnings is 
the r (industry rate of return) multiplied by the weighted average of common equity from time t-1 
to t.  
Again, I validate the premise that disaggregating overall performance into NormROE and 
AbROE would improve predictive power by comparing the Adj. R
2
 of the disaggregate model to 
that of the aggregate model, using the Vuong (1989) test.  I find that the predictive power of the 
disaggregate model is larger by 0.035, 0.071, and 0.077 in the  Pre-IFRS, Trans-IFRS, and Post-
IFRS periods, respectively (significant at the one-percent level), indicating that the shift toward 
an asset/liability view increases the comparability of a firm to its within-country peers thus 
making firm-specific deviations incrementally predictive. 
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5.3 Results from Regressing Analysts Forecasts (Tests of H3)   




tjFROE  regression results to test whether analysts are utilizing the 
increase in comparability by basing their forecasts on firm-specific information.  I examine 
changes in tjROE , , as an indication of the extent that analysts incorporate industry performance 
into their forecasts.  I find a decrease of 0.091 in the coefficient on tjROE , , in the aggregate 
model in the Post-FAS 87 period but the coefficient increases by 0.107 and 0.137 during the 
Post-FAS 115 and Post-FAS 133/7 periods, respectively.   
Within Table 6, *, **, *** indicate two-way significance at the ten-, five-, and one-
percent levels, respectively; #, ##, ### indicate one-way significance at the ten-, five-, and one-
percent levels, respectively.  The number of observations are: 9,900; 7,700; 7,700; 6,600; and, 
6,600 for sample periods Pre-FAS 87 (1978–1986), Post-FAS 87 (1987–1993), Post-FAS 115 
(1994–2000), Post-FAS 133/7 (2001–2006), and Post-FAS 157-9 (2007–2012), respectively. In 
regressing equations (3‟) and (4‟), I include as a control the number of analysts following 
(determined as the frequency of forecasts from the I/B/E/S detail file) calculated as 1 divided by 
the number of analysts following firm j in year t.  FROE is the average of the one-year-ahead 
earnings forecasts from the I/B/E/S detail file, calculated from the first forecast per analyst made 
after the announcement of prior period‟s earnings.  ROE is earnings before extraordinary items 
minus dividends paid to preferred shareholders, for firm j in year t, divided by a weighted 
average of common equity from time t-1 to t.  AbROE is earnings, minus dividends paid to 
preferred shareholders, minus normal earnings, for firm j in year t, divided by a weighted 
average of common equity from time t-1 to t.  Normal earnings is the r (industry rate of return) 
multiplied by the weighted average of common equity from time t-1 to t.  
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0.040 0.250 0.082 0.049 0.214 0.036 0.085 0.002
8.85 *** 9.36 *** 9.01 *** 7.55 *** 2.44 **
0.065 0.159 0.068 0.071 0.129 0.052 0.074 0.006 #
15.80 *** 8.04 *** 15.29 *** 5.69 *** 3.08 ***
[Diff ('87-'93  '78-'86)] -0.091 *** -0.086 ** 0.016
0.104 0.266 0.140 0.114 0.235 0.059 0.144 0.004 #
15.43 *** 10.30 *** 15.26 *** 8.18 *** 3.13 ***
[Diff ('94-'00  '87-'93)] 0.107 *** 0.106 *** 0.007
0.134 0.403 0.272 0.141 0.341 0.117 0.282 0.010 ##
19.89 *** 16.37 *** 19.32 *** 9.96 *** 3.46 ***
[Diff ('01-'06  '94-'00)] 0.137 *** 0.106 ** 0.058
0.180 0.314 0.227 0.188 0.240 0.137 0.244 0.017 ###
28.14 *** 14.37 *** 26.71 *** 7.78 *** 4.55 ***
[Diff ('07-'12  '94-'00)] -0.089 *** -0.101 ** 0.020
Table 6
Tests of H3: Results from Estimating the Aggregate and Disaggregate Models - Analyst Forecasts





























During the Post-FAS157-9 period, I observe a decrease of 0.089 (all significant at the 
one-percent level).  The increases in the coefficient on tjROE , , are inconsistent with the earlier 
findings that the persistence on ROE was dropping, suggesting that analysts may have been 
overweighting aggregate performance during these periods.  The results from testing H3a with 
the disaggregate model reveal no significant changes in the coefficient on tjAbROE ,   as 
standards shift over time.  This suggests that analysts are, surprisingly perhaps, not increasing the 
weighting on firm-specific information as one might expect given the results from H1a 
(increases in the coefficient on tjAbROE , ).   
As before, I examine changes in predictive power by comparing the Adj. R
2
 of the 
disaggregate model to that of the aggregate model, using the Vuong (1989) test.  I find relatively 
weak results in the earlier periods, an improvement of 0.006 and 0.004 in the Post-FAS 87 and 
Post-FAS 115 periods, respectively (significant at the ten-percent level).  I also find only mild 
improvements in the Adj R
2
 0.010 and 0.017 in the Post-FAS 133/7 and Post-FAS 157-9 periods, 
respectively (significant at the five- and one-percent levels, respectively).  Although I find 
statistically significant evidence that analysts‟ reliance on financial reporting grew over time, the 
magnitude is unlikely to be economically significant.  The weak predictive power suggests that 
analysts view the disaggregation as noisy or simply rely on information not yet reflected in the 
financials.   
5.4 Sensitivity Tests 
5.4.1 Firm Losses 
 I partition my samples into loss and profit firms and repeat my analysis.  This is done to 
highlight the expected differences in profit and loss firms.  In general, I find a decline in the 
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coefficient on tjROE , . My results for loss firms are presented in Table 7.a.  When testing H1a 
with loss firms, I find the coefficient on tjAbROE ,  increases in the earlier two periods, Post-FAS 
87 and Post-FAS 115, but then levels off and decreases in the latter two periods, Post-FAS 133/7 
and Post-FAS 157-9.  This decrease in the coefficient on tjAbROE ,  is contrary to my main 
findings in Table 4 and may reflect the volatility of the economy at the time, as these later time 
periods would likely be affected by the global financial crisis.  My results for H1b show an 
improvement in the predictive power of the disaggregated model over the aggregate model in all 
except the last period, Post-FAS 157-9, consistent with volatile economic times.   
 My results for profit firms are shown in Table 7.b.  I find a general decrease in the 
coefficient on tjROE ,  
in both the aggregate and disaggregate models during all periods except 
for Post-FAS 133/7.  When testing H1a with profit firms, I find the coefficient on tjAbROE ,  
generally increasing. My results for H1b show an improvement in the predictive power of the 
disaggregated model over the aggregate, in all periods, consistent with the mail results. 
Table 8.a presents the results from my international sample.  This table shows that my 
results for loss firms are consistent with the results from testing H2a, in that I find a general 
increase over time in the coefficient on tjAbROE , .  My results of testing H2b for loss firms are 
also consistent with the main tests.   Table 8.b, presents my results from testing profit firms, in 
my international sample.  For profit firms, when testing H2a, I find an increase in the coefficient 
on tjAbROE ,  only when comparing the Post-IFRS period to the Pre-IFRS period.  When testing 
H2b, I find an improvement in the predictive power of the disaggregate model over the aggregate 









0.045 1.069 0.135 0.010 1.296 -0.169 0.150 0.015 #
4.83 *** 7.76 *** 0.70 8.96 *** -3.05 ***
-0.010 0.747 0.502 0.033 0.611 0.194 0.511 0.008 #
-0.79 24.05 *** 1.86 * 12.02 *** 3.29 ***
[Diff ('87-'93 - '78-'86)] -0.322 *** -0.684 *** 0.363 ***
0.061 0.573 0.339 0.179 0.358 0.406 0.393 0.054 ###
4.53 *** 13.49 *** 9.22 *** 6.29 *** 6.40 ***
[Diff ('94-'00 - '87-'93)] -0.174 *** -0.253 *** 0.212 ***
-0.001 0.478 0.257 0.068 0.310 0.377 0.290 0.032 ###
-0.06 10.93 *** 4.07 *** 6.02 *** 5.18 ***
[Diff ('01-'06 - '94-'00)] -0.096 -0.048 -0.029
0.006 0.487 0.245 0.041 0.440 0.136 0.248 0.004
0.41 11.1 *** 1.93 * 8.39 *** 1.58
[Diff ('07-'12 - '94-'00)] 0.010 0.130 * -0.241 ***
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Table 9.a presents my results from my analyst forecast tests using loss firms.  I find a 
weak increase in the coefficient on tjAbROE ,  in the Post-FAS 115 period and then a weak 
decrease in the Post- FAS 157-9 period, where I found no differences across the full sample in 
my test of H3a.  But, I again find no support for H3b in that I do not find significant increases in 
predictive power of the disaggregate model over the aggregate model.   
My results from testing profit firms are presented in Table 9.b.  When testing H3a, I find 
an increase in the coefficient on tjAbROE ,  in the Post-FAS 133/7 period, only.  When testing 
H3b, I find significant increases in predictive power of the disaggregate model over the 
aggregate model, especially in the later time periods.  Overall, my analyst forecast results again 
suggest that analysts are not fully incorporating the greater comparability of either profitable or 
unprofitable firms.   
5.4.2 Firm Size 
Next, I partition my samples by size, by total assets, and highlight the differences 
between small and large firms.  Table 10.a presents my results for small firms.  I find a general 
decrease in the coefficient on tjROE , , in the aggregate model as I did in Table 4.  When testing 
H1a, I find the coefficient on tjAbROE ,  increases in the earlier two periods, Post-FAS 87 and 
Post-FAS 115, but then levels off in the latter two periods, Post-FAS 133/7 and Post-FAS 157-9.   
This leveling off may reflect the volatility of the economy at the time, as these later time periods 
would likely be affected by the global financial crisis. My results for H1b show an improvement 
in the predictive power of the disaggregated model over the aggregate model in all periods, 
consistent with my main results in Table 4.  For large US firms, shown in Table 10.b, my results 









0.057 0.329 0.019 0.030 0.526 -0.139 0.032 0.013
5.02 *** 1.82 * 1.54 2.61 *** -1.81 *
0.046 -0.016 -0.002 0.035 -0.003 -0.044 -0.001 0.001
6.19 *** -0.33 2.33 ** -0.07 -0.75
[Diff ('87-'93 - '78-'86)] -0.345 * -0.529 *** 0.094
0.084 0.043 -0.001 0.124 -0.006 0.133 0.010 0.010
6.59 *** 0.46 4.96 *** -0.06 1.82 *
[Diff ('94-'00 - '87-'93)] 0.059 -0.003 0.177 *
0.051 0.158 0.029 0.062 0.137 0.057 0.030 0.001
4.68 *** 2.39 ** 4.13 *** 1.91 * 0.74
[Diff ('01-'06 - '94-'00)] 0.115 0.143 -0.076
0.066 0.009 -0.001 0.032 0.058 -0.138 0.015 0.016
4.24 *** 0.11 1.79 * 0.69 -1.66 *
[Diff ('07-'12 - '94-'00)] -0.149 -0.079 -0.195 *











Tests of H3: Results from Estimating the Aggregate and Disaggregate Models  - Analyst Forecasts, Loss Firms





















Tests of H3: Results from Estimating the Aggregate and Disaggregate Models  - Analyst Forecasts, Profit Firms




0.047 0.251 0.051 0.058 0.201 0.050 0.056 0.005 ##
10.00 *** 7.32 *** 10.32 *** 5.66 *** 3.28 ***
0.069 0.192 0.072 0.076 0.158 0.066 0.081 0.010 ##
14.77 *** 6.68 *** 14.48 *** 5.17 *** 4.17 ***
[Diff ('87-'93 - '78-'86)] -0.059 -0.043 0.016
0.090 0.306 0.166 0.095 0.288 0.052 0.169 0.003 #
15.03 *** 9.96 *** 14.38 *** 8.90 *** 2.65 ***
[Diff ('94-'00 - '87-'93)] 0.115 *** 0.130 *** -0.014
0.095 0.464 0.290 0.101 0.398 0.150 0.307 0.017 ##
15.55 *** 14.61 *** 15.06 *** 9.82 *** 3.91 ***
[Diff ('01-'06 - '94-'00)] 0.158 *** 0.110 ** 0.098 **
0.134 0.366 0.241 0.142 0.273 0.210 0.281 0.039 ###
24.24 *** 13.62 *** 23.80 *** 7.88 *** 6.58 ***
[Diff ('07-'12 - '94-'00)] -0.098 ** -0.126 ** 0.060




































0.018 0.780 0.444 0.017 0.787 -0.007 0.444 0.000
4.94 *** 33.78 *** 4.26 *** 33.46 *** -0.73
0.001 0.768 0.587 0.025 0.646 0.155 0.593 0.006 ##
0.28 26.71 *** 3.13 *** 14.56 *** 3.68 ***
[Diff ('87-'93 - '78-'86)] -0.012 -0.141 *** 0.162 ***
0.052 0.544 0.401 0.090 0.373 0.259 0.439 0.038 ###
9.66 *** 17.34 *** 12.20 *** 9.42 *** 7.65 ***
[Diff ('94-'00 - '87-'93)] -0.224 *** -0.273 *** 0.104 ***
0.039 0.628 0.448 0.055 0.502 0.189 0.460 0.012 ##
6.94 *** 17.62 *** 8.00 *** 11.18 *** 4.57 ***
[Diff ('01-'06 - '94-'00)] 0.084 * 0.129 ** -0.070
0.048 0.461 0.261 0.075 0.300 0.301 0.304 0.043 ###
7.19 *** 11.18 *** 8.69 *** 5.49 *** 5.33 ***
[Diff ('07-'12 - '94-'00)] -0.167 *** -0.202 *** 0.112
Table 10.a














Intercept ROE Intercept ROE AbROE
Aggregate Model Disaggregate Model
tjtjtj ROEROE ,,101,   tjtjtjtj AbROEROEROE ,,2,101,  
48 
 




0.027 0.731 0.416 0.023 0.750 -0.019 0.417 0.001
7.54 *** 29.79 *** 6.33 *** 30.87 *** -2.06 **
0.032 0.545 0.433 0.064 0.402 0.235 0.460 0.027 ###
6.22 *** 17.13 *** 9.59 *** 10.80 *** 6.06 ***
[Diff ('87-'93 - '78-'86)] -0.186 *** -0.347 *** 0.254 ***
0.096 0.260 0.180 0.120 0.181 0.195 0.223 0.043 ###
15.94 *** 9.05 *** 19.62 *** 6.73 *** 7.77 ***
[Diff ('94-'00 - '87-'93)] -0.285 *** -0.221 *** -0.040
0.082 0.318 0.227 0.100 0.194 0.315 0.280 0.053 ###
13.64 *** 10.74 *** 15.89 *** 6.47 *** 7.66 ***
[Diff ('01-'06 - '94-'00)] 0.058 0.012 0.120 **
0.104 0.280 0.139 0.126 0.079 0.523 0.281 0.142 ###
13.27 *** 8.09 *** 16.20 *** 2.02 ** 9.75 ***
[Diff ('07-'12 - '94-'00)] -0.038 -0.115 ** 0.208 ***
Table 10.b
Tests of H1: Results from Estimating the Aggregate and Disaggregate Models  - Future ROE, Large Firms






Intercept ROE Intercept ROE AbROE
Post-FAS 157-9 
(2007-2012)






tjtjtj ROEROE ,,101,   tjtjtjtj AbROEROEROE ,,2,101,  
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Table 11.a presents my results for testing small firms, internationally. My results are 
consistent with the results for H2a, in that I find an increase in the coefficient on tjAbROE , when 
comparing the first and last periods.  I again find support for H2b with an improvement in the 
predictive power of the disaggregate model over the aggregate model in all periods for small 
firms.   
For large firms, shown in Table 11.b, when testing H2a, I find increase in the coefficient 
on tjAbROE ,  during the transition period, but a decrease upon adoption of IFRS.  The decrease 
during the Trans-IFRS period, however, was small enough that when comparing the Post-IFRS 
to the Pre-IFRS periods, I find an overall increase in the coefficient on tjAbROE , .  I again find 
support H2b with an improvement in the predictive power of the disaggregate model over the 
aggregate model in all periods for large firms, internationally. 
Next, I present my results for tests related to analyst forecasts.   Table 12.a shows that for 
small firms, there is little evidence to suggest that analysts are incorporating the effects of the 
shift toward an asset/liability view.  This is not surprising since fewer analysts follow smaller 
firms, thus more noise surrounds the information for smaller firms.   
In Table 12.b, for large firms, however, I do find support for H3a with an increase in the 
coefficient on tjAbROE , but only in the Post-FAS 133/7 period.  This finding suggest that 
analysts did find this shift in accounting standards useful in forecasting future firm performance, 
at least for the often complex accounting for derivative instruments and hedging activities.  It is 
the later time periods that I also find support for H3b in that I find an increase in predictive 
power of the disaggregate model relative to the aggregate model. 
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0.032 0.304 0.098 0.050 0.145 0.267 0.158 0.060 ###
7.50 *** 12.95 *** 11.95 *** 5.31 *** 11.35 ***
-0.074 0.341 0.103 -0.073 0.219 0.299 0.166 0.063 ###
-9.56 *** 13.11 *** -10.41 *** 7.59 *** 10.07 ***
   [Diff (Trans - Pre)] 0.036 0.074 0.032
-0.084 0.319 0.127 -0.052 0.182 0.312 0.210 0.083 ###
-21.38 *** 28.06 *** -14.76 *** 14.69 *** 21.86 ***
***
   [Diff (Post - Trans)] -0.021 -0.037 0.013
   [Diff (Post - Pre)] 0.015 0.037 0.046 *
TABLE 11.a
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0.083 0.253 0.060 0.090 0.214 0.096 0.071 0.012 ##
27.16 *** 7.70 *** 28.05 *** 6.19 *** 4.44 ***
0.030 0.158 0.024 0.001 0.119 0.248 0.083 0.059 ###
5.54 *** 4.72 *** 0.20 3.48 *** 7.21 ***
   [Diff (Trans - Pre)] -0.094 ** -0.096 * 0.152 ***
0.065 0.177 0.040 0.055 0.114 0.195 0.081 0.041 ###
23.12 *** 10.88 *** 17.90 *** 6.75 *** 11.11 ***
   [Diff (Post - Trans)] 0.019 -0.005 -0.053 **











Intercept ROE Intercept ROE AbROE
Tests of H2: Results from Estimating the Aggregate and Disaggregate Models - International, Large Firms
Table 11.b
tjtjtj ROEROE ,,101,  











0.051 0.249 0.060 0.058 0.221 0.029 0.061 0.000
9.37 5.94 7.79 *** 4.93 *** 1.18
0.081 0.104 0.034 0.086 0.081 0.045 0.039 0.004
18.79 4.25 16.20 *** 2.95 *** 1.60
[Diff ('87-'93 - '78-'86)] -0.145 *** -0.140 *** 0.017
0.113 0.223 0.115 0.114 0.220 0.009 0.114 0.000
13.80 5.95 12.93 *** 5.57 *** 0.30
[Diff ('94-'00 - '87-'93)] 0.119 *** 0.139 *** -0.037
0.121 0.429 0.301 0.127 0.372 0.155 0.315 0.014 #
17.22 12.55 15.70 *** 8.14 *** 2.96 ***
[Diff ('01-'06 - '94-'00)] 0.205 *** 0.152 ** 0.146 **
0.158 0.367 0.249 0.168 0.278 0.205 0.278 0.029 ###
23.84 12.38 22.62 *** 7.05 *** 4.68 ***
[Diff ('07-'12 - '94-'00)] -0.062 -0.094 0.050
Post-FAS 87 
(1987-1993)
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5.4.3 Intangible Intensity 
Next I partition my samples by intangible intensity.  Table 13.a presents the results for 
the subset of highly intangible firms.  For these firms, I find weak evidence of a decrease in 
coefficient on tjROE ,  in the aggregate model.  When testing H1a for firms in intangible based 
industries, I find the coefficient on tjAbROE ,  increases in the Post-FAS 87 and Post-FAS 115, 
but then levels off in the latter two periods, Post-FAS 133/7 and Post-FAS 157-9.  As with other 
controls tested, this leveling off may reflect the volatility of the economy at the time.  
In Table 13.b, I present the results from the low intangible intensity subset of firms.  I 
find a general decrease in coefficient on tjROE ,  in the aggregate model and disaggregate modes, 
consistent with my main results for H1a.  As with my main results for H1b, I find an 
improvement in the predictive power of the disaggregated model over the aggregate model in all 
periods. 
Table 14.a presents the results of testing intangible intensive firms, internationally.  My 
results are consistent with my main tests of H2a and H2b, an increase on the coefficient on 
tjAbROE ,  and an improvement in the predictive power of the disaggregated model over the 
aggregate model in all periods.   
In Table 14.b, I present the results from the low intangible intensity subset of firms, from 
my international sample.  Intangible intensity is defined at an industry level.  Again, my results 
are I find an increase on the coefficient on tjAbROE , , when testing H2a, and an improvement in 










0.037 0.718 0.457 0.035 0.728 -0.010 0.457 0.000
4.38 *** 13.61 *** 4.10 *** 13.84 *** -0.57
0.049 0.512 0.416 0.069 0.414 0.159 0.437 0.021 #
3.52 *** 6.78 *** 4.96 *** 5.53 *** 2.99 ***
[Diff ('87-'93 - '78-'86)] -0.206 ** -0.314 *** 0.170 ***
0.067 0.416 0.360 0.141 0.266 0.271 0.421 0.060 ###
6.48 *** 10.89 *** 12.02 *** 7.26 *** 8.85 ***
[Diff ('94-'00 - '87-'93)] -0.096 -0.148 * 0.112 *
0.024 0.430 0.329 0.047 0.274 0.305 0.370 0.042 ###
2.72 *** 9.06 *** 5.63 ** 6.78 *** 6.14 ***
[Diff ('01-'06 - '94-'00)] 0.014 0.008 0.034
0.098 0.289 0.139 0.122 0.121 0.404 0.239 0.100 ###
7.19 *** 4.55 *** 9.38 *** 1.95 6.12 ***
[Diff ('07-'12 - '94-'00)] -0.140 * -0.154 ** 0.099
Post-FAS 157-9 
(2007-2012)














Aggregate Model Disaggregate Model
Intercept ROE AbROE









0.021 0.760 0.428 0.018 0.774 -0.014 0.433 0.005
7.89 *** 42.74 *** 6.44 *** 43.39 *** -2.05 **
0.010 0.695 0.535 0.433 0.533 0.223 0.547 0.012 ###
2.81 *** 30.01 *** 7.47 *** 16.49 *** 6.91 ***
[Diff ('87-'93 - '78-'86)] -0.065 ** -0.241 *** 0.237 ***
0.069 0.409 0.280 0.102 0.256 0.283 0.355 0.075 ###
14.29 *** 14.61 *** 19.00 *** 8.85 *** 10.50 ***
[Diff ('94-'00 - '87-'93)] -0.287 *** -0.277 *** 0.060
0.066 0.467 0.325 0.089 0.305 0.310 0.373 0.048 ###
13.44 *** 16.58 *** 15.29 *** 9.11 *** 8.43 ***
[Diff ('01-'06 - '94-'00)] 0.058 0.049 0.027
0.069 0.381 0.209 0.099 0.182 0.431 0.287 0.078 ###
12.37 *** 12.97 *** 14.71 *** 4.69 *** 8.91 ***
[Diff ('07-'12 - '94-'00)] -0.086 ** -0.123 ** 0.121 **
Tests of H1: Results from Estimating the Aggregate and Disaggregate Models  - Future ROE, Low Intangible
Table 13.b










Aggregate Model Disaggregate Model















0.068 0.282 0.078 0.082 0.198 0.174 0.112 0.033 ###
26.44 *** 11.78 *** 30.48 *** 7.76 *** 9.43 ***
0.005 0.291 0.077 -0.019 0.173 0.305 0.153 0.077 ###
1.13 11.45 *** -3.41 *** 6.31 *** 11.36 ***
   [Diff (Trans - Pre)] 0.009 -0.025 0.131 ***
0.002 0.290 0.099 0.004 0.177 0.269 0.166 0.067 ###
0.62 25.43 *** 1.86 * 14.53 *** 20.62 ***
   [Diff (Post - Trans)] -0.001 0.004 -0.036








Tests of H2: Results from Estimating the Aggregate and Disaggregate Models - International, Low Intangible Firms
Table 14.b
Intercept ROE




tjtjtj ROEROE ,,101,   tjtjtjtj AbROEROEROE ,,2,101,  
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Tables 15a and 15.b present my results for tests related to analyst forecasts.   The lack of 
results, as shown in Table 15.a, for tests of H3a, is not surprising given that accounting 
information for intangible intensive firms is not expected to be as relevant (Amir and Lev 1996).   
With my main tests of H3b, I found improvements in Adj R
2
 that, while statistically significant, 
are not likely to be economically meaningful.  For the subset of intangible intensive firms, 
however, I fail to even find weak significance in any of my tests.   
In Table 15.b, I find that for firms of low intangible intensity, some increase on the 
coefficient on tjAbROE , , when testing H3a, and an improvement in the predictive power of the 
disaggregated model over the aggregate model in all periods, when testing H3b.  Together, the 
results of my analyst forecast tests suggest that the shift toward the asset/liability view may not 
benefit those firms in intangible intensive industries. 
5.4.4 Shift toward Principles-Based Standards  
 I also consider the effects of the shift towards principles-based reporting and create 
subsamples of firms that are highly influenced by principles-based standards and those that are 
the least influenced.  I use the P-score measure developed by Folsom et al. (2011) which 
captures the extent to which a firm is affected by principles-based standards.     My results from 
testing H1a and H1b on my sample partitioned by P-score are discussed in further detail below.  
 Tables 16.a and 16.b present the results of testing H1a and H1b on my sample partitioned 
by P-score.  In Table 16.a, I find that for US firms that are highly influenced by the shift towards 
principles-based standards (high P-score firms), my results are subdued compare to the entire 
sample used in my main tests.  That is, I find a decrease in coefficient on tjROE , , in the 









0.044 0.171 0.027 0.042 0.182 -0.009 0.022 -0.005
2.65 *** 1.58 1.65 * 1.26 -0.17
0.082 0.141 0.058 0.088 0.105 0.059 0.064 0.006
7.05 *** 0.06 6.03 *** 1.42 1.37
[Diff ('87-'93 - '78-'86)] -0.030 -0.077 0.068
0.094 0.310 0.176 0.096 0.307 0.006 0.174 -0.001
7.39 *** 6.25 *** 5.65 *** 5.48 *** 0.16
[Diff ('94-'00 - '87-'93)] 0.169 *** 0.202 ** -0.053
0.133 0.453 0.303 0.135 0.436 0.034 0.306 0.003
15.01 *** 12.01 *** 14.60 *** 9.03 *** 0.62
[Diff ('01-'06 - '94-'00)] 0.143 *** 0.129 * 0.028
0.173 0.354 0.247 0.177 0.331 0.051 0.248 0.002
18.78 *** 8.40 *** 17.15 *** 6.31 *** 1.06















Aggregate Model Disaggregate Model
Tests of H3: Results from Estimating the Aggregate and Disaggregate Models  - Analyst Forecasts, High Intangible Firms





















0.048 0.253 0.084 0.059 0.210 0.045 0.088 0.004 #
12.45 *** 8.95 *** 11.88 *** 7.20 *** 2.79 ***
0.073 0.159 0.068 0.080 0.129 0.053 0.074 0.006 #
24.14 *** 7.66 *** 21.49 *** 5.77 *** 2.78 ***
[Diff ('87-'93 - '78-'86)] -0.095 *** -0.081 ** 0.008
0.105 0.231 0.106 0.113 0.194 0.076 0.112 0.006 #
17.59 *** 6.83 *** 17.08 *** 5.42 *** 3.06 ***
[Diff ('94-'00 - '87-'93)] 0.072 * 0.066 0.023
0.096 0.408 0.276 0.107 0.316 0.176 0.301 0.025 ##
17.62 *** 12.30 *** 15.46 *** 6.86 *** 4.05 ***
[Diff ('01-'06 - '94-'00)] 0.177 *** 0.122 ** 0.100 **
0.134 0.308 0.201 0.147 0.207 0.183 0.233 0.032 ###
28.16 *** 11.48 *** 24.67 *** 5.54 *** 5.03 ***












Pre-FAS 87     
(1978-1986)
Tests of H3: Results from Estimating the Aggregate and Disaggregate Models  - Analyst Forecasts, Low Intangible Firms
Table 15.b
Intercept ROE Intercept ROE AbROE






















0.023 0.785 0.500 0.021 0.795 -0.011 0.499 0.000
3.25 *** 18.18 *** 2.72 *** 17.42 *** -0.66
-0.004 0.720 0.555 0.017 0.641 0.113 0.558 0.003
-0.35 13.59 *** 0.93 8.52 *** 1.40
[Diff ('87-'93 - '78-'86)] -0.065 -0.154 0.123
0.064 0.435 0.299 0.097 0.284 0.248 0.332 0.033 ##
4.84 *** 5.52 *** 6.87 *** 3.60 *** 4.37 ***
[Diff ('94-'00 - '87-'93)] -0.285 *** -0.358 *** 0.135
0.091 0.521 0.349 0.111 0.263 0.482 0.456 0.107 ##
5.78 *** 6.65 *** 6.96 *** 2.76 *** 4.51 ***
[Diff ('01-'06 - '94-'00)] 0.086 -0.020 0.234 *
0.074 0.345 0.122 0.092 0.016 0.696 0.334 0.212 ##
4.64 *** 3.31 *** 6.86 *** 0.15 5.19 ***
[Diff ('07-'12 - '94-'00)] -0.176 -0.247 * 0.214
Table 16.a
Tests of H1: Results from Estimating the Aggregate and Disaggregate Models  - Future ROE, High P-Score
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0.043 0.672 0.370 0.044 0.669 0.004 0.370 0.000
6.24 *** 13.68 *** 7.49 *** 15.53 *** 0.22
0.028 0.713 0.513 0.041 0.647 0.102 0.518 0.005
2.37 ** 7.81 *** 2.95 *** 6.69 *** 1.32
[Diff ('87-'93 - '78-'86)] 0.041 -0.022 0.098
0.073 0.342 0.272 0.085 0.272 0.152 0.309 0.037 ##
6.76 *** 4.13 *** 10.67 *** 4.21 *** 3.33 ***
[Diff ('94-'00 - '87-'93)] -0.371 *** -0.374 *** 0.050
0.089 0.227 0.099 0.106 0.171 0.139 0.125 0.025 #
9.17 *** 2.97 *** 10.74 *** 2.61 *** 2.70 ***
[Diff ('01-'06 - '94-'00)] -0.115 -0.101 -0.013
0.071 0.342 0.284 0.087 0.255 0.220 0.311 0.027
9.53 *** 4.43 *** 11.19 *** 3.92 *** 2.52 **
[Diff ('07-'12 - '94-'00)] 0.115 0.085 0.080






Aggregate Model Disaggregate Model









Intercept ROE Intercept ROE AbROE
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For these US firms, I find minimal evidence, when testing H1a, of an improvement to 
firm-specific information as the coefficient on tjAbROE ,  increases only in the Post-FAS 133/7 
period.  I find when testing H1b with high P-score firms, however, improvement in predictive 
power of the disaggregate model relative to the aggregate model in the Post-FAS 155, Post-
FAS133/7, and Post-FAS 157-9 periods.  My results suggest that the shift toward the 
asset/liability view enhance the predictive usefulness beyond the effect of the shift toward 
principles-based standards in the US. 
My results for US firms in the low P-score subset of my sample, presented in Table 16.b, 
are similar with respect to the decrease in the coefficient on tjROE , , in the aggregate and 
disaggregate models.  But I find no evidence of an improvement to firm-specific information, 
when testing H1a, and I find weak improvements to predictive power of the disaggregate model, 
when testing H1b.  These results suggest that for firms that are not strongly affected by the shift 
toward principles, are also not strongly affected by the shift toward the asset/liability view of 
accounting. Next, I present the results of partitioning my international sample by P-score.   
In Table 17.a, I find for the subset of high P-score firms, a decrease in the coefficient on
tjROE , , in the aggregate model during the Trans-IFRS period only.  This differs slightly from 
the stable coefficient on tjROE , , that I found in the full sample.  Where I found improvements to 
firm-specific information in the full international sample, I do not find such evidence in the 
subset of high P-score firms, when testing H2a,  The changes over time are all insignificant at 
conventional levels.  When testing H2b using the subset of high P-score firms, I do find 
improvement to the predictive power of the disaggregate model over the aggregate model in all 






With my subset of low P-score international firms, Table 17.b, I find an overall 
improvement to firm-specific information when comparing the Post-IFRS period to the Pre-IFRS 
period, but unlike my main results, this is not driven by an improvement during the Trans-IFRS 
period.  Further, I find improvement to the predictive power of the disaggregate model over the 
aggregate model in the Post-IFRS period only, when testing H2b. 
Finally, Table 18.a presents the results of my tests related to analyst forecasts, for high P-
score firms.  I fail to find support for significant changes in either industry or firm-specific 
information suggesting that for these firms, analysts are not incorporating the shift toward an 
asset/liability view into their forecasts of firm performance.  In Table 18.b, for low P-score firms, 
however, I do find decrease in the coefficient on tjROE , , in the aggregate model that I have 











0.103 0.285 0.064 0.106 0.294 0.061 0.069 0.004
8.71 *** 1.40 8.84 *** 1.49 0.49
0.039 0.223 0.032 0.021 0.234 0.305 0.125 0.093
1.34 0.93 0.61 1.02 1.71 *
   [Diff (Trans - Pre)] -0.062 -0.059 0.244
0.069 0.013 -0.001 0.057 -0.046 0.305 0.119 0.120 ##
5.40 *** 0.16 4.01 *** -0.62 3.95 ***
   [Diff (Post - Trans)] -0.210 -0.280 0.000
   [Diff (Post - Pre)] -0.272 -0.340 0.244 *
Post-IFRS 
Adoption 










Intercept ROE Intercept ROE AbROE
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0.065 0.090 0.004 0.063 0.096 -0.007 -0.002 -0.006
5.61 *** 1.38 4.36 *** 1.45 -0.14
0.070 0.098 0.024 0.075 0.079 0.032 0.026 0.002
7.02 *** 2.57 ** 6.36 *** 1.77 * 1.05
[Diff ('87-'93 - '78-'86)] 0.008 -0.016 0.039
0.073 0.232 0.111 0.086 0.175 0.111 0.124 0.013
3.03 *** 2.44 ** 3.45 *** 1.74 * 2.32 **
[Diff ('94-'00 - '87-'93)] 0.133 0.096 0.079
0.142 0.287 0.153 0.151 0.109 0.316 0.249 0.096
5.85 *** 3.75 *** 6.65 *** 0.84 2.36 **
[Diff ('01-'06 - '94-'00)] 0.056 -0.066 0.206
0.161 0.320 0.196 0.171 0.078 0.405 0.309 0.114
8.90 *** 4.43 *** 9.93 *** 0.68 2.84 ***
[Diff ('07-'12 - '94-'00)] 0.032 -0.031 0.088
Table 18.a
Tests of H3: Results from Estimating the Aggregate and Disaggregate Models  - Analyst Forecasts, High P-Score
ROE AbROE
Aggregate Model Disaggregate Model
































0.027 0.537 0.084 0.036 0.497 0.035 0.081 -0.003
2.27 ** 5.69 *** 1.36 3.44 *** 0.39
0.098 0.058 0.007 0.116 -0.031 0.133 0.044 0.037
13.31 *** 1.06 9.18 *** -0.45 2.19 **
[Diff ('87-'93 - '78-'86)] -0.479 *** -0.528 *** 0.097
0.078 0.357 0.347 0.083 0.323 0.060 0.352 0.006
4.88 *** 2.35 ** 5.15 *** 2.13 ** 1.93 *
[Diff ('94-'00 - '87-'93)] 0.299 * 0.355 ** -0.072
0.081 0.418 0.389 0.093 0.381 0.104 0.402 0.013
6.29 *** 4.20 *** 7.01 *** 4.22 *** 1.36
[Diff ('01-'06 - '94-'00)] 0.061 0.058 0.044
0.114 0.417 0.304 0.133 0.300 0.270 0.341 0.037
5.51 *** 3.77 *** 5.94 *** 2.52 ** 2.35 **









Aggregate Model Disaggregate Model
Tests of H3: Results from Estimating the Aggregate and Disaggregate Models  - Analyst Forecasts, Low P-Score
Table 18.b




















6.  CONCLUSIONS 
 Over the past several decades, accounting standard setters have been gradually shifting 
financial reporting from a revenue/expense view to an asset/liability view, by rewriting the 
underlying conceptual framework and issuing accounting standards that reflect this view.  I find 
that this shift towards an asset/liability view to date, in the US, has generally increased the 
predictive usefulness of accounting information.  I further find that the adoption of IFRS across a 
broad cross-section of countries has also increased the predictive usefulness of accounting 
information, where IFRS incorporates more fair values in accounting than typically found in 
local GAAP, thus shifting the viewpoint further toward an asset/liability view.  Since current US 
GAAP incorporates fewer fair value accounting requirements than IFRS, or even than the 
previous local GAAP of most adopting countries, my results suggest that the adoption of IFRS in 
the US will continue to shift accounting information further toward the asset/liability view and 
likely increase its predictive usefulness. 
My evidence provides support that the shift toward an asset/liability view achieved the 
FASB‟s goal, as expressed in SFAC 8, of providing information that is helpful in assessing the 
future prospects of a firm.  I also find, however, that analysts (who serve as important market 
intermediaries) have not increased their reliance on firm-specific accounting information as the 
standards shifted over time, even though my evidence indicates that the predictive usefulness of 
firm-specific information has increased.  To the extent that other sources of information are more 
costly, analysts and others could increase the efficiency in which they form their forecasts by 
increasing their reliance on firm-specific information. 
While I analyze the shift in standards toward an asset/liability view broadly over a 35 
year span, future research could delve deeper to analyze what elements in the shift in viewpoint 
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enhanced predictive usefulness.  Specifically, research could focus on particular standards that 
further shifted GAAP towards an asset/liability view, and the characteristics of those standards 
associated with greater predictive usefulness.  Future research could also examine why analysts 
to date have been reluctant to incorporate firm-specific information into their forecasts, as my 
evidence suggests is the case.  Possible reasons could be that other information outside the 
financial statements is readily available with today‟s technology; or, analysts could be skeptical 
on the quality of accounting information, since the shift toward an asset/liability view likely 
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